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The ethical challenge of multiculturalism 
 
In 2007, in Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, 16-year-old Aqsa Parvez was 
murdered by her father and brother for refusing to wear the hijab.1 According to 
media reports, not one of the 12 people present in the house at the time would bear 
witness to this “honor killing.”2  Discussing this crime in a workshop for South 
Asian women three years later, Aruna Papp3, a Toronto Family therapist, noted 
with alarm, that the consensus among the 19 South Asian Mothers present was 
that Aqsa brought her death upon herself for being a disobedient daughter.  
 
In Canada there is an average of approximately 2 honor killings of girls and 
women every year4 (though in 2011, 3 teenage girls and a superfluous wife in the 
Shafia family of Ontario were murdered all at the same time in a so-called honor 
killing).  Papp’s worry, however, is not primarily focused on the horror of 
culturally driven murder. Her worry, rather, is more general; namely that those of 
us brought up immersed in the values of the Western world, and who normally 
could be relied on to fight vigorously in defense of equality and freedom for all, 
have somehow been rendered mute to the creeping female oppression that is 
sneaking in through the back door of multiculturalist tolerance. Thus Papp writes:  
 
The ideology of multiculturalism, even among the most well-meaning 
advocates for female equality, tends to preclude any discussion of cultural 
values and traditions. Such advocates are afraid of being seen as 





2 Papp 2010, p. A11. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
Such advocates of multiculturalism run amok are afraid to ever imply some 
cultures are better than others where treatment of women is concerned 
(emphasis added). 
 
Problematically, most advocates and activists for female victims of abuse 
shy away from challenging the immigrant communities to examine their 
own traditions and cultural values in explaining the violence in their homes.5  
 
 
In poignant emphasis of Papp’s point, four days later in the same newspaper, 
the founders of Free the Children, (an organization whose mission is to eliminate 
the exploitation of children around the world), Craig and Marc Kielburger sang 
praises to the Designer House of Givenchy for sending models down catwalks with 
their faces covered in protest the French government’s ban on burkas. The French 
law, which the Kielburgers refer to as “institutionalized racism” and one that 
“counteracts the gains we’ve made toward a more tolerant world,”6 fines women 
$190 US if they are caught wearing a face-covering in public, while it fines men 
who force their wives or daughters to wear such face coverings $38,000 and up to 
a year in prison (emphasis added to underscore that the Kielburger thus apparently 
think that there is no problem with women being forced to wear face coverings). 
The Kielburgers’ objections to such a law are that it further isolates such women 
and perpetuates stereotypes that Muslim women are submissive, and that it 
validates racism and Islamophobia in the West.   
 
These opposing views create a dilemma for those of us outside the Muslim 
tradition who (a) wish to adopt the most ethical attitude possible but (b) believe 
that women covering their faces is, at least on the face of it (!), symbolic of 
oppression, subservience, and gender inequality. What would the notion of 
“respect for persons” have us do? Ought we to follow Papp’s call to vigorously 
challenge “the immigrant communities to examine their own traditions and cultural 
values,” or ought we, rather, to follow the lead of Kielburgers and vigorously 
defend cultural differences, at least those that are not obviously harmful? How 
might philosophy help us answer this question? 
 




6 Kielburger 2010, p. B3. 
Kant famously argued that morality requires that we treat others never 
merely as “means to ends” but also always as “end-in-themselves.” Kant argued 
that we ought to do so because to act morally was to act freely.  If we take either 
part of Kant’s dictum to be true, i.e., that (1) morality requires that we treat others 
as ends (which I take to be the Kantian definition of “respect for persons”) and/or 
(2) that treating others as ends is actually a benefit to ourselves, we are nonetheless 
left with the problem of having an unclear guide as to what precisely treating 
others as ends requires that we do. What precisely does “respect for persons” 
demand of us? 
 
The guideline that most easily emerges from this categorical imperative is 
that, since Kant took the paradigm characteristic of persons to be the capacity for 
self-conscious rational choice, respecting persons would appear to require of us 
that, at least as long as a choice does not hinder the choices of others, we ought to 
honour the choices that another makes.   
 
Honoring choices.  
 
This “liberal” ideal of honoring the choices of others as a foundational value 
has wide-ranging repercussions. The medical establishment, for example, whose 
original compass was anchored in the value of paternal beneficence, now expects 
doctors to consult patients and to honor their choices, at least in so far as those 
choices are not illegal and/or unprofessional, and as long as they can be considered 
authentic, and not a result of pain and fear, or the pressure of manipulating 
relatives. But this is the elephant in the room, is it not?  How can we know when a 
patient chooses to, for example, forego life-saving treatment that it is “her choice”?  
And returning to our original topic, how can we know when a Muslim woman 
chooses to wear a hijab, or a more pronounced face covering such as the niqaab, 
that that it is really “her choice”?   
 
 
Supporting “real” choice requires challenging the chooser. 
 
Within the medical context, Buchanan and Brock argue, in their article 
Standards of Competence, that the degree to which one ought to shoulder the 
responsibility of checking to make sure that the patient’s choice does indeed stem 
from her “own conception of her own good”7 varies with the degree to which the 
 
7 Buchannan 2009, p.28. 
potential outcome is substantially worse than other alternatives.8 Buchanan and 
Brock stress that what is important in such scrutiny is that one focus on the process 
of the decision-making (rather than the actual decision made), which would 
include a check to make sure that all other options are clearly understood. With 
regard to the interesting question as to whether or not we have a responsibility to 
check whether wearing the veil is an authentic choice, since veiling one’s face 
almost inevitably distorts and/or curtails communication with those outside one’s 
reference group thus short-circuiting the kind of communicative rationality9 
necessary to underpin authentic choice, Buchanan and Brock’s position suggests 
that we shirk our responsibility if we do not challenge this practice. 
 
Drawing from a more feminist tradition, Susan Sherwin worries about 
Buchanan and Brock individualized method of evaluating autonomous choice as it 
fails to recognize the possibility of “internalized oppression.”10 Sherwin argues that 
we need to distinguish “agency” from “autonomy,” where agency can be described 
as the capacity to merely exercise reasonable choice, while autonomy, i.e., self-
governance, requires that one have the capacity to at least recognize and possibly 
(perhaps even easily) resist structures that may be oppressive.11 According to 
Sherwin, “The condition of being oppressed can be so fundamentally restrictive 
that it is distorting to describe as autonomous some specific choices made under 
such conditions”12 (emphasis added).  Interestingly, Sherwin focuses on Western 
women in this regard. She says, for example, that many Western women “believe 
they have no real choice but to seek expensive, risky cosmetic surgery because 
they accurately perceive that their opportunities for success in work or love depend 
on their more closely approximating some externally defined standard of beauty.”13 
Sherwin’s example thus brings some balance to the “veil argument” by pointing 
out that many Western women may be as blind to their own oppression as those 
they seek to liberate. Sherwin goes on to argue that if we are truly concerned that 
individuals have the opportunity to live autonomously by making real choices, then 
it is not enough to merely offer these individuals choices. “It also requires that the 
person have had the opportunity to develop the skills necessary for making the type 
of choice in question, the experience of being respected in her decisions, and 
encouragement to reflect on her own values.”14 And Sherwin goes on to say that it 
 
8 Ibid., p. 30. 
9 Of the sort described by Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action.  
10 Sherwin 2009, pp. 41-2. 
11 Ibid., p. 40. 
12 ibid., p. 37. 
13 Ibid., p. 37. 
14 Ibid., p. 42. 
is the society, not just the agent, that ought to be the subject of critical scrutiny 
under the rubric of what she refers to as “relational autonomy”15 (emphasis added). 
In so doing, her position supports Papp’s call to vigorously challenge communities 
(immigrant or otherwise) to examine their traditions and cultural values that may, 
by their very nature, preclude genuinely autonomous choice.  
 
Is wearing a veil a sign of internal oppression? 
 
With regard to the question of whether wearing the veil can be accurately 
perceived as a sign of internal oppression, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, in her book Nomad, 
argues forcefully that the greatest slavery of Muslim women is indeed internal. She 
writes, for example, that in Muslim schools, both abroad and in the West, “girls 
learn all day long to be subservient and lower their eyes, to veil themselves to 
symbolize the suppression of their individual will. They are taught to internalize 
male superiority and walk very softly into the mosque by a back door. In weekend 
Quran schools, girls learn that God requires them to obey, that they are worth less 
than boys and have fewer rights before God.”16 
 
With regard to the veil, Ali writes that the “different sorts of masks and 
beaks and burkas are all gradations of mental slavery”—that “The veil deliberately 
marks women as private and restricted property, nonpersons—that the veil sets 
women apart from men and apart from the world; it restrains them, confines them, 
grooms them for docility. A mind can be cramped just as a body may be, and a 
Muslim veil blinkers both your vision and your destiny. It is the mark of a kind of 
apartheid, not the domination of a race but of a sex.”17  
 
Yet Ali is not surprised by the fact that “Many Muslim women in Western 
societies are demanding that they be allowed to wear the hijab (the head scarf)—
some even the niqaab (the face covering with only the eyes showing).”  “These 
women,” according to Ali, “believe that their own bodies are so powerfully toxic 
that even making eye contact with other people is a sin.  The extent of self-loathing 
that this expresses,” Ali believes, “is impossible to exaggerate . . .”18 And Ali goes 
on to say that though a veiled woman “may be downtrodden from an objective 
standpoint . . . she doesn’t feel that way. . . . she is protected from loneliness. She 
belongs. She has the certainty, the strength, the clear goals that stem from belief.”19 
 
15 Ibid., p. 42. 
16 Ali 2010,  p. 129. 
17 Ibid., p. 16. 
18 Ibid., p. 18. 
19 Ibid., p. 39. 
This is her opportunity “to be like a child again, protected, taken by the arm and 
told what is right and what is wrong, what to do and what not to do—to take a 
break from thinking.”20 
 
Unlike those of us outside the tradition, Ayaan Hirsi Ali has the credentials 
and knows whereof she speaks. She was brought up in the Muslim way during her 
childhood in Somali and later in Kenya. She was subjected to female genital 
mutilation (FGM) without anesthetic at the age of five. And for those of you who 
think that this abomination—this cutting off of the young girl’s clitoris and the 
excision of the lips of her vagina so that they fuse together in wait for the virginity 
test of her wedding night—is just an aberration, it is important to note that roughly 
130 million women around the world have had their genitals cut:21 i.e., this 
amounts to approximately six thousand little girls being subjected to genital 
mutilation every day.  A brief survey of various countries reveals that, for instance, 
98% of Somali women have undergone FGM, 97% in Egypt, 95% in Mali, and 
90% in Sudan.22    
 
Ali goes on to note that since all but the most assimilated (of immigrant) 
parents want their children to marry within the community, and since they believe 
that an “impure” girl, i.e., one whose clitoris and vagina are intact, will not find a 
husband, it is not farfetched to assume that it is not an infrequent occurrence for 
little girls to have their genitals cut without anesthetic on kitchen tables in many 
parts of the West.23 
 
In support of this assumption, Ruth Macklin, in her article Ethical Relativism 
in a Multicultural Society, reports that the medical community is indeed 
increasingly experiencing requests for genital cutting, as well as increasingly 
having to deal with incidents of hemorrhage and/or infection following “at home” 
ritual female circumcision. Trying to walk a reasonable path through this 
treacherous multicultural territory, Macklin relates a talk given by a physician who 
conducted research with East African women living in Seattle, and who argued that 
“Western physicians must curb their tendency to judge cultural practices different 
from their own as ‘rational’ or ‘irrational.’” This physician went on to say that 
 
20 Ibid., p. 38. 
21 Ibid., p. 128. 
22 All figures come from Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender 
Perspective/Violence Against Women (2003), Report of the special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/52/. 
23 Ali 2010,  p. 128. 
“Ritual genital cutting is an ‘inalienable’ part of some cultures, and it does a 
disservice to people from those cultures to view it as a human rights violation.” 
Furthermore, “in countries where female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced, 
circumcised women are ‘normal’.”24--thus trying to make a case in support for the 
increasing number of requests for genital cutting by immigrants to the Western 
world.25 
 
Arguing against this position that she characterizes as “overtolerance,”26 
Macklin notes that since cultures change over time, it makes little sense to consider 
any ritual as “inalienable” (let alone one that does harm—what in logic circles is 
known as an illegitimate appeal to tradition27), to say nothing of the fact that the 
statistical normality of FGM no more supports its legitimacy than the fact that 
malnutrition and malaria are “normal” in Africa supports the suggestion that it 
ought to be maintained.28 Macklin goes on to point out that, in any case, there is an 
inherent contradiction in the very notion of “multiculturalism.” If the basic premise 
of multiculturalism is that “all cultural groups be treated with respect and as 
equals,” what does this imply, she asks, with regard to cultural groups that oppress 
or fail to respect other cultural groups? And even more problematic, what does this 
imply with regard to cultural groups that oppress or fail to respect sub-groups 
within their own cultures?29 
 
Ali would reply that tolerance of oppression internal to a group is “racism of 
low expectations—that this Western attitude is based on the idea that people of 
colour must be exempted from ‘normal’ standards of behavior.”30  She expresses 
anger that “this subjugation is silently tolerated, if not endorsed . . . by so many in 
Western societies where the equality of the sexes is legally enshrined.”31 And she 
is particularly aghast that “Even though their predecessors had once agitated for 
the rights of workers, the rights of women, and the rights of blacks, American 
liberals today are hesitant to speak out against the denial of rights (and the ill 
treatment of women) that is perpetrated in the name of Islam.”32  
 
 
24 Macklin 2009, p. 53. 
25 Ibid., p. 52. 
26 Ibid., p. 49.  
27 Gardner 2009,  p. 84. 
28 Macklin 2009,  p. 53. 
29 Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
30 Ali 2010,  p. xviii. 
31 Ibid., p. 16. 
32 Ibid., p. 106. 
Terry Glavin, in his book entitled Come from the Shadows, makes a similar 
point when he notes the disturbing tendency for human rights to be viewed as a 
peculiarly Western set of values. Glavin argues that this belief primarily benefits 
Western Liberals as it underscores a sense of superiority while simultaneously 
distancing themselves from the struggles of others in the name of respecting their 
cultural customs. “As if people in other societies somehow find oppression more 
agreeable.”33  
 
It could be argued, however, that such criticism of the apparent 
“overtolerance” of Western Liberals is unfairly harsh, as it fails to recognize the 
fact that differentiating authentic choice from quasi-choice that emerges from 
internal oppression is often difficult, and that it is this “masking” of authenticity, 
not condescension or lack of care, that the a major cause of a retreat behind 
tolerance.  
 
Differentiating authentic choice from quasi-choices that emerge from internal 
oppression.  
 
In her book A Quiet Revolution: The Veil’s Resurgence from the Middle East 
to America, Leila Ahmed, a professor of Divinity at Harvard Divinity School, 
attempts to explore the threads of authentic versus “forced” choice as they are 
woven through the modern resurgence of the veil.  Ahmed notes that this 
resurgence is particularly perplexing in light of the fact that, in the 1950’s, being 
unveiled and bareheaded was the norm in the cities in Egypt and other Muslim 
majority societies.34 Ahmad discusses at length the growing strength of the Muslim 
Brotherhood35 (who have affirmed the veil as a foundational Islamic requirement)36 
and Islamism’s ‘quintessentially political agenda’ of Islamizing society.37 She 
notes that even here in America, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) 
appears to embrace what the veil seems to imply: male dominance and gender 
hierarchy and separation.38 Nonetheless, she notes that a reluctance to discard the 
veil on the part of some women is at least partially a function of the fact that this 
may be perceived by non-Muslims as reinforcing the colonial assumption that it 
 
33 Sajoo 2011,  p. A11. 
34 Ahmed 2011,  p. 10. 
35 Brotherhood members are typically welcome immigrants because they are typically well-
educated: engineers, chemists, doctors, scientists, and teachers. (Ahmed  2011, p. 57.)  
36 Ahmed 2011,  p. 8. 
37 Ibid., p. 9. 
38 Ibid., p. 7. 
was the job of white men to save brown women from brown men.39 Her 
exploration of the history of the veil resurgence supports this claim. Following 
Nasser’s and the Arab world’s devastating defeat by Israel in the war of 1967, a 
mood of religiosity swept across the Arab world.40 The defeat was interpreted as a 
clear sign of God’s punishment of Arabs for putting their faith in nationalism and 
secularism and turning away from Islam.41 Women who now took up the veil 
reported undergoing an “internal transformation,” or feeling “psychologically and 
intellectually separated from mainstream society.”42 And the dress enabled them to 
easily recognize each other.43 The general goal of this movement was to bring forth 
the ideal Islamic Society and to oppose such ideologies as Communism, Zionism, 
and Feminism.44 The standardization of material and colour visibly modeled the 
egalitarian principles of social equality and justice for all. Islamic dress provided a 
way to “sit in judgment of mainstream society,”45 and it imbued women with a 
kind of moral and religious authority that might discourage sexual harassment 
(which, in Egyptian universities, was routine).46 In Saudi Arabia, particularly 
following the soaring oil prices after the war of 1973, Islamic dress became a sign 
of wealth, chic, and prestige.47 Nonetheless Ahmed notes that both religious and 
social pressures made it difficult for individual women to choose not to wear the 
veil.48  She notes that researchers studying the Islamist movement more broadly 
suggest that veiling spread because male leaders conceived of veiling as 
strategically important to the movement,49as a sign of resistance to Western 
civilization and of the beginning of iltizam (pious commitment) toward Islam,50 
and as a pushback against the degradation heaped on Muslims as a result of the 
economic imperialism of the West.51 The resurgence of the veil supported 
widespread optimism for an Islamist future, particularly as it accompanied what 
appeared to be a cultural decline of the West.52 Ahmed notes, though, that this so-
called optimistic view of the future includes a “biologization” (i.e., enslavement) 
 
39 Ibid., p. 24. 
40 Ibid., p. 66. 
41 Ibid., p. 66. 
42 Ibid., p. 79. 
43 Ibid., p. 79. 
44 Ibid., p. 79. 
45 Ibid., p. 86. 
46 Ibid., p. 87. 
47 Ibid., p. 101. 
48 Ibid., p. 124. 
49 Ibid., p. 131. 
50 Ibid., p. 134. 
51 Ibid., p. 139. 
52 Ibid., p. 154. 
of Muslim women—an ideological picture that was reinforced by the influential 
Islamist theorist and member of the Brotherhood in the 1950 and 60’s, Sayyid 
Qutb, who was executed by Nasser in 1966.  Sayyied Qutb stated unequivocally 
that the woman’s responsibility to society is synonymous with her biological 
function in life. Being the caretakers of the family and children define women’s 
identity, importance and dignity.53   
 
We thus leave Ahmed’s exploration with the sense that Muslim women have 
been caught in a double bind. If she covers her face, she will inevitably short-
circuit her capacity to access alternative viewpoints and challenges which in turn 
will undermine her ability to make real “self-affirming” choices (even if she avoids 
the religious and cultural oppressive practices that often accompany the wearing of 
the veil). Yet if she refuses the face covering, she undermines the efforts of her 
men, her religion, and her culture to launch a visible public pushback against the 




Though on the face of it, it appears as if Muslim women are caught in a real 
dilemma, it is actually a false one, as there is third option already readily available 
whereby Muslim women can reaffirm her loyalty to the people and ideology that 
she cherishes, while not undermining the communicative rationality necessary to 
maintain her status as a person. The third option is that she can wear the hijab, i.e., 
the head covering. Thus, to the degree that criticism of full face covering is 
accompanied by a celebration of “the hijab option,” charges of racism and 
promoting Islamaphobia54are defused.  Indeed, if criticism of face covering is 
persistently paired with an honoring of the hijab, it will be become evident that 
condemnation of any sort of face covering has nothing whatsoever to do with 
Islamaphobia. It will become clear that those who denigrate the covering of one’s 
face do so not because it is perceived as a sign of religious piety; it is deemed 
wrong because it threatens the communicative personhood of the woman who 
wears it (and hence, importantly, the personhood of her female offspring).  Face 
covering also instills highly-charged preoccupying worries in countless Western 
Liberals who fear that to tolerate such practices is to tolerate rampant oppression 
(witness the energy imbued in the writing of this paper). Echoing this pervasive 
 
53 Ibid., p. 108. 
54 Kielburger 2010,  p. B3. 
worry, Craig McInnes,55 a noted member of the editorial board of the Vancouver 
Sun, writing in support of Canada’s new restriction on veiling one’s face while 
taking the oath of citizenship, notes that the practice of females covering their 
faces is troubling because it is associated with parts of the world where women 
have fewer rights than men and that therefore we ought to be legitimately worried 
that this unacceptable inequality is filtering into Canada.  As well, echoing the 
communicative issue discussed above, McInnes says that what he finds even more 
troubling is that wearing the veil is “like hiding behind a one-way mirror; (that 
wearing) a mask allows a person to read the faces of others without themselves 
being read” –and that therefore “wearing a full face covering is just plain “rude.”56 




The overall conclusion to which this foray into veil territory thus brings us is 
this. It is a mistake to perceive persons and their choices as “objects” in the sense 
of “things that ought to be revered as one finds them,” and to do a “liberty dance” 
around them to the tune of the sort favored by John Stewart Mill.  To do so, is to 
view a person or a culture as one might view a work of art, as if one has an 
obligation to preserve it as a finished product. In Buber’s terms, this is to enter into 
an “I-It” relationship with the other, rather than one he poetically describes as “I-
Thou.” 
 
It brings us to the conclusion that respect, rather, requires the sort of 
communicative interchange that underscores one’s recognition that one is freedom 
interacting with others who are essentially free (to borrow Sartre terms); it is to 
embody a deep understanding that we are processes57 not objects, and that, as 
such, the foundational cognitive/moral attitude ought to be one of genuine, though 
challenging, curiosity with regard to the ever-changing social landscape and the 
wildly different ways in which persons, not wholly dissimilar to ourselves, attempt 
to carve out a good life.  
 
It is absolutely imperative, however, that we keep in mind that “the other” 
may be unwilling and/or unable to meet us in the “in-between” of communicative 
rationality, and that even if such an interchange takes place, compatibility may not 
 
55 McInnes 2011,  p. A1. 
56 Ibid., p. A9. 
57 Or, as Sartre says more poetically “I am what I am not, and I am not what I am.”   
be possible. In such situations, personhood, nonetheless, requires of us that we 
vigorously don the mantle of active responsibility in the lifelong pursuit of 
constantly reconstructing our own best answers to the questions that life 
continuously asks of us.58  
 
And so, with regard to the specific questions that address us here, the 
answers seem to be as follows.  
With regard to harmful traditions, such a Female Genital Mutilation, 
precisely because they cause harm, the onus lies squarely with those who would 
continue such practices to articulate a reason-based defence of such traditions, 
which in turn needs to compete “objectively” against the very strong reasons that 
oppose them.  
With regard to veiling, since the sort that hides the human face interferes 
with the communicative interchange that is necessary to maintain mutually 
dependent personhood, if the choice is forced, then clearly it ought not to be 
respected. If the wearer argues that the choice is hers, since the practice is 
indicative of a shirking of one’s responsibility to do one’s part in maintaining our 
common humanity (though she maintains a one-way read on others), it is a form of 
disrespect, and hence ought not to be respected. And since, to those outside the 
practice, a veiled face is symbolic of internal oppression that cries out for external 
assistance, to the degree that those who maintain this practice know this, this is 
similar to crying “Fire” when they themselves perceive no threat present. This, too, 
is a form of disrespect that ought not to be respected. 
“Respect for persons” is not, and should not be seen as, unconditional. 
Respect is an attitude of openness and genuine inquiry that fuels communicative 
rationality that, in the best of times, leads to the sort of rational choice that Kant 
envisioned. However, when others refuse to play by these communicative rules, a 
one-sided attempt to maintain “the game of respect” that is essentially 
intersubjective is not only futile, it undermines one’s responsibility to maintain of 
one’s own self respect.  
The short answer to the veil question is, thus, that face covering, if 
apparently a product of personal choice, is disrespectful to others, and hence ought 
not to elicit respect. If face covering is not a product of personal choice, it is 
 
58 Frankl 1984,  p. 98. 
oppressive, and hence also ought not to elicit respect. The practice of face covering 
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